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要旨 
フロンティアの知識労働者は、大学の研究室における博士の研究指導(トレーニング)により
供給されており、現代の知識基盤社会において不可欠なものである。それにもかかわらず博士
の研究指導に関する理解は、大学の研究室内部へのアクセスが限定的なため、これまで十分に
なされていなかった。また博士課程修了者の初期キャリアの把握が難しいことから、博士課程
における研究指導の効果を評価することは困難であった。本研究では日本の大学院博士課程を
修了した約 5,000人のコホート調査である「博士人材追跡調査」のデータを用いることで、こ
れまでの研究上の限界を超え、大学の研究室における研究指導とその効果を明らかにすること
を試みた。 
結果は、1）博士課程修了者のキャリア選択について幾つかの変数をコントロールしてなお、
指導教員の指導頻度が高いことが、学位取得率、研究と仕事の関連度を高める、2）所属大学の
その他の教員の指導頻度が、論文や賃金のパフォーマンスを高める、3）所属大学以外の教員の
指導が学位取得率やアカデミック・キャリアの選択率を高める、4）教員でない者（先輩・ポス
ドク等）の指導頻度がアカデミック以外のキャリア選択率を高める、等が明らかになった。1991
年からの大学院の量的整備により教員１人当たりの学生数が増加し、また教育研究以外の組織運
営や研究費獲得に伴う申請・評価業務の増加により教員の負担が増している。本研究からも明ら
かになったように、様々な指導者が高い頻度で博士学生の研究指導に当たることが、博士のその
後のキャリアや博士課程満足度にプラスの効果をもたらすことから、指導教員に代わる指導者や、
指導教員を支える専門能力を有するスタッフの整備が、今後一層、必要となって来るだろう。 
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ABSTRACT 
PhD training in academic labs offers the foundation for the production of frontier knowledge 
workers, indispensable for the modern knowledge-based society. Nonetheless, our understanding on 
PhD training has been insufficient due to limited access to the inside of academic labs. Furthermore, 
early careers of PhD graduates are often difficult to follow, which makes the evaluation of training 
outcome challenging. To fill in these limitations, this study aims to illustrate the settings of PhD training 
in academic labs and examine their impact on several aspects of training outcome, drawing on "Japan 
Doctoral Human Resource Profiling", a national survey of a cohort of 5000 PhD graduates from 
Japanese universities.  
Our regression analyses controlling for several variables indicate the following results: (1) PhD 
students who received frequent instruction by their official supervisors are likely to successfully earn 
degrees and engage in jobs related to their dissertation subjects; (2) frequent supervision by internal 
faculty members is associated with high performance both in academia (based on publications) and in 
industry (based on wage rates); (3) frequent supervision by external faculty members is associated with 
successful degree attainment and academic career choice; and (4) frequent supervision by non-faculty 
members (e.g., postdocs and senior students) is associated with non-academic career choice. The 
expansion of postgraduate education since 1991 has increased the number of students per supervisor, 
which has added to the workload of faculty members, along with other duties such as administration and 
fundraising. The result indicates that frequent supervision by multiple faculty members improves career 
outcomes and students' satisfaction, suggesting the need for secondary instructors as well as expert staff 
supporting faculty members. 
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博士課程での研究指導状況とインパクト－「博士人材追跡調査」による総合的な分析－ 
 
現代社会において我々が直面する社会的課題の解決には、科学的知識が必要とされており、
知識牽引型社会という傾向は益々強まっている。そのため知識フロンティア人材の育成は、持
続可能な社会において一層重要性を増している（Bozeman et al., 2001）。にもかかわらず、大
学等のアカデミアにおける高度知識人材の育成は、現実の社会的ニーズを十分に満たしていな
いと批判されることが多い(National Research Council, 1998; Cyranoski et al., 2011)。 
このようなアカデミアにおける人材育成の課題は、教育政策と科学政策の間のギャップに起
因している部分がある。また近年では、政策の説明責任（アカウンタビリティー）を重視する
あまり短期的評価のみを強調し、人材育成のような長期的利益や効果が見落されがちになると
いう傾向もある（Hackett, 1990）。 
そこで本研究では、日本の博士課程修了者のコホート調査である「博士人材追跡調査」を用
い、教育政策と科学技術政策の間を繋ぐことを試みた。同調査は 2014 年に実施され、2012 年
度中に日本の博士課程を修了した者を母集団としている。サンプル数は 5,052で、回収率 38.1％
である。大学院研究室における研究指導状況（トレーニング）とその後のキャリアの状況を同
時に知ることが出来るデータとなっている。研究室において誰がどのくらいの頻度で指導する
のかという「指導状況」を測定し、それが博士号取得を含むキャリア選択、その後のパフォー
マンス、博士課程満足度等にどのように影響を及ぼすかを分析した。 
サンプルの構成は、学生種別で見ると 15％が課程学生、34％が社会人学生、15％が留学生で
ある。また、博士課程での専攻分野は理学 17％、農学７％、保健 29％、人文 8％、社会 9％、
その他 6％となっている。平均年齢は 38歳、女性は全体の 28％である（回答数ベース）。 
本研究ではまず指導者の組み合わせと指導の頻度によって、「指導状況」を規定している。予
想通り、多くの学生は所属大学の指導教員によって指導されているが、一部には所属大学以外
の教員や、教員以外（先輩・ポスドク等）による指導を受けている者や、指導者がいないとい
う場合もある。 
概要図表１は指導者別の指導頻度を示したものである。博士課程学生の 52%は指導教員から
週に 1回以上の頻度で指導を受けている。また所属大学のその他の教員から少なくとも月 1、2
回以上の指導を受けている者は 35%、所属大学以外の教員から少なくとも半年に 1 回以上の指
導を上受けている者は 13%、先輩・ポスドクといった教員以外から指導を受けている者は 21％
いることが分かる。また指導頻度を見ると、概要図表 2のように月 1回以上の頻繁な指導に関
わった教員の数が 1人の場合は 53%、2人の場合は 36%であり、月 1回以上の指導がない者は 11%
となっている。 
基本統計量と回帰分析のどちらの結果からも、博士課程学生の属性による「指導体制」の違
いが明らかになっている。まず社会人学生の場合は課程学生と比較して、指導教員や先輩・ポ
スドクといった教員以外の指導が少なく指導頻度も低い。外国人学生は指導教員や所属大学の
その他の教員によって指導を受けることが多いが、外部の教員による指導は少ない。保健(医
学・歯学・薬学・看護)分野の学生は、指導教員によって指導されるよりも、所属大学のその他
の教員による指導頻度が高い。また人文・社会系も指導教員による指導頻度は低い。国内論文
シェアで見た大学グループ別にみると、研究力の高い大学では指導教員による指導が少なく、
先輩・ポスドクといった教員以外の指導頻度が高くなっている。 
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概要図表１ 指導者と指導頻度 
 
 
概要図表２ 指導者の人数 
  
注）月 1回以上の指導に関与した教員数（非教員は除く）    
 
 
本研究では、これらの指導体制がどのように職業選択や博士課程の満足感に影響しているか
について検証を行っている。分析の結果は概要図表 3に纏めている。まず指導体制によるキャ
リア選択に関連した影響を見ている。キャリアの第 1段階としての学位の取得であるが、指導
教員による頻繁な指導は博士課程学生の学位取得に明らかにプラスの影響を与えている。 
次に博士のアカデミック・キャリアの選択であるが、指導教員、または所属大学以外の教員
の頻繁な指導を受けた場合に、アカデミアに進路を取る傾向にある。また先輩やポスドクとい
った教員以外の者から頻繁に指導を受けた場合に、アカデミア以外のキャリア選択率を高める。
研究と仕事の関連度については、指導教員の指導頻度が高いか、あるいは複数の教員による指
導の場合に、関連の強い仕事を得ているという結果を示している。 
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概要図表３ 指導体制の影響 a  
被説明変数 
説明変数 
学位取得 
アカデミック 
・キャリア 
研究と仕事
の関連度 c 
論文数 d 賃金率 e,f 
博士課程 
満足度 
各担当者の指導頻度
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+ ++ ++++ 
所属大学外の教員 +++ +++ 
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- 
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g 
0人（vs. 1 人） ---- - 
   
---- 
2人（vs. 1 人） 
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a) 表内の各記号は、本編 Table3 Model3/4(学位取得)、 Table4 Model1/3/4(アカデミック・キャリア)、 Table5 
Model3/4(研究と仕事の関連度)、Table6 Model5/6(論文数)、Table7 Model3/4(賃金率)、Table8 Model1/2(博
士課程満足度)から、係数の符号と有意水準を示している。+/-: p < .10; ++/--: p < .05; +++/---: p < .01; 
++++/----: p < .001。 
b) 学位取得への効果を介した間接効果 
c) アカデミック・キャリアを選択した修了生のみ。 
d) 国内論文シェアの高い、大学第 1グループのみ。 
e) 国内論文シェアの高い、大学第 1・2グループのみ。 
f) 非アカデミック・キャリアを選択した修了生のみ。 
g) 月１回以上の指導に関与した教員数。 
 
次に、指導体制による博士のパフォーマンスへの影響を検証している。雇用先がアカデミア
の場合に論文数で見ると、研究力の高い大学でのみ、所属大学の教員による指導頻度が高い場
合に論文数が増える傾向にある。非アカデミアの場合、論文数ではパフォーマンスを測るのに
適切ではない可能性があるため、代理変数として賃金率を用いている。結果はアカデミアの場
合と同様で、研究力の高い大学で、所属大学のその他の教員や複数の教員による指導が、賃金
率と正に相関することを示している。  
最後に、指導体制による博士全体の満足度への影響を見ている。研究分野に関わらず、指導
頻度が高い場合に、博士課程満足度を有意に上げることを示している。また指導者の数が多い
場合に満足度は高く、指導者が 1人以下の場合に満足度が低いことが明らかになっている。 
1991年からの大学院の量的整備により教員１人当たりの学生数が増加し、また教育研究以外
の組織運営や研究費獲得に伴う申請・評価業務の増加により教員の負担が増している。本研究
からも明らかになったように、様々な者が高い頻度で博士学生の研究指導に当たることが、そ
の後のキャリアや博士課程満足度にプラスの効果をもたらす。指導教員に代わる指導者や、指
導教員を支える専門能力を有するスタッフの整備が、今後一層、必要となるだろう。 
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1. Introduction 
The modern society is increasingly becoming knowledge-driven and major challenges our society faces 
today require solutions with scientific expertise, and thus, the development of human capital at the 
knowledge frontier is crucial for the sustainability of our society (Bozeman et al., 2001). The 
development of knowledge workers typically takes the form of postgraduate education, in which 
research training (academic training, hereafter) plays an essential role. Academic training is a 
significant investment that costs students several years or possibly longer and supervisors considerable 
time and efforts (Stephan, 2012). Nevertheless, the contemporary academic training practices have been 
criticized, for example, for failing to meet changing societal needs and for producing excessive PhDs 
(National Research Council, 1998; Cyranoski et al., 2011). 
These problems in academic training are partly attributable to a gap between (mass) education policies 
and science policies. Further, recent policies have stressed accountability that is often translated into 
short-term and merit-based evaluation, and a relatively long-term payoff from academic training tends to 
be overlooked (Hackett, 1990). A similar gap exists in literature between studies on higher education 
and those on knowledge production. Though academic career design has been a popular subject (e.g., 
Allison and Long, 1990; Geuna, 2015; Stephan, 2012), early careers are relatively understudied. Among 
others, empirical difficulty in accessing two types of data has been compromising our understanding on 
academic training. First, prior studies had poor access to the inside of academic labs where training 
takes place. Ethnographies in sociology of science have illustrated the details of lab operation (Campbell, 
2003; Delamont and Atkinson, 2001; Delamont et al., 1997 ; Salonius, 2007), but their implications are 
restricted to certain lab contexts. Second, tracing early careers of academics is often challenging. A few 
countries have implemented surveys to follow the careers of PhD graduates; such as Science and 
Engineers Statistical Data System (SESTAT) in the USA and Destinations of Leavers from Higher 
Education (DLHE) in the UK. These systematic efforts have contributed to our understanding on early 
careers of academics (Agarwal and Ohyama, 2012; Roach and Sauermann, 2010). Nonetheless, career 
data and training data have rarely been integrated, and thus, we still have insufficient understanding on 
how academic lab training leads to the development of S&T human capital. 
The objective of this study is to address these gaps with the national survey of Japanese PhD graduates, 
which inquired into both PhD training settings and traced their careers. The population of the survey is a 
cohort of PhD students who graduated from Japanese universities in 2012, and 5,052 responses were 
collected in 2014. The result finds that supervisory settings -- a supervising team and frequency of 
supervision -- influence the PhDs' career decisions, scientific and economic performance, and their level 
of satisfaction on the PhD program. 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews previous literature. Section 3 
overviews the Japanese postgraduate education system. Section 4 explains our data. Section 5 presents the 
2 
results. Section 6 discusses the results and implications. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Postgraduate education programs employ various education approaches, usually involving 1) a general 
component that provides students with knowledge commonly needed across the discipline, often through 
mass teaching, and 2) a specific component that aims to develop knowledge and skills concerning a 
certain area of expertise specific to the lab through a research project, or academic training. Prior 
literature on higher education has paid relatively limited attention to the latter compared to the former. 
This is partly because of empirical difficulty in observing the inside of labs, where academic training 
occurs. A lab consists of a team of scientists including a supervising professor and junior members 
including students (Delamont and Atkinson, 2001; Latour and Woolgar, 1979; Owen-Smith, 2001). The 
core part of academic training employs the apprenticeship model, where students are tasked to solve 
research questions as a member of a research project under the supervision of professors (National 
Research Council, 1998). Some anthropological studies did investigate the inside of academic labs in 
depth, illustrating how academic science operates in specific labs in a great detail (Delamont and 
Atkinson, 2001; Delamont et al., 1997; Knorr-Cetina, 1999; Latour and Woolgar, 1979; Salonius, 2007), 
but academic training was not necessarily of their primary interest and a general picture is lacking 
(Shibayama et al., 2015). Scientometric techniques have been developed to identity student-supervisor 
relationships (Lariviere, 2012; Morichika and Shibayama, 2016), but they cannot reveal the details of the 
interpersonal relationships. 
Tracing postgraduate careers of students presents another challenge. While identifying established 
academics is fairly feasible thanks to increasingly available career data of academics (Gaughan and 
Bozeman, 2002), early careers are still difficult to identify because academic jobs in early stages tend to 
change frequently and be made insufficiently public. Moreover, if graduates are employed outside 
academia, their career information is usually kept private, and even if it is publicly available, linking it 
with education record poses another challenge. Addressing these difficulties require systematic and 
perhaps authoritative efforts for data collection. Indeed, a few national surveys have been implemented, 
such as SESTAT in the USA and DLHE in the UK, and contributed to our understanding on higher 
education systems. For example, Agarwal and Ohyama (2012) used SESTAT to investigate the link 
between scientists' ability, preferences, and their career development. Roach and Sauermann (2010), 
drawing on Survey of Doctorate Recipients (SDR) in the USA, predicted the innovative performance of 
PhD graduates based on their motives. Nevertheless, the focus of these surveys is to follow postgraduate 
careers rather than to understand pre-graduate conditions. To link the two elements, therefore, scholars 
have needed to rely either on additional data sources or on their original surveys in smaller scales. 
Addressing these issues, the current study aims to investigate the impact of academic training at three 
3 
aspects of training outcome such as PhD graduates' performance, their career choice, and their 
subjective evaluation on training programs. The third aspect has been relatively well studied. A line of 
higher-education literature evaluated PhD programs from students' perspective in various dimensions 
(e.g., Marsh et al., 2002). Among others, Morrison et al. (2011), based on a survey of PhD graduates in 
Social Sciences in the USA, found that the quality of advice from dissertation supervisors is associated 
with students' evaluation on the excellence of PhD programs. Similarly, Mainhard et al. (2009) 
suggested that the availability of PhD supervisors is a key determinant of the perceived quality of PhD 
supervision. These studies have confirmed that lab settings and the relationship between students and 
supervisors play a critical role, but they tend to be detached from the impact of training on career 
development and performance.  
The link between higher education and later career development has been studied in the literature on 
sociology of science and education and on science policies (e.g., Geuna, 2015; Long et al., 1979). For 
the above-mentioned reasons, however, they have rarely examined the detail of supervisory settings but 
relied on more observable factors. Among others, many studies found that the prestige of 
degree-awarding departments determines the destination of academic careers (e.g., Baldi, 1995; Crane, 
1965; Debackere and Rappa, 1995). Long et al. (1979), analyzing postgraduate careers of biochemical 
PhDs in the US, also found that the prestige of the first academic jobs is significantly influenced by the 
performance of PhD supervisors in addition to the prestige of the degree-awarding departments. 
Similarly, studies in sociology and science policies have been studying the link between higher 
education and performance and found the organizational prestige and supervisors' performance to be 
strong predictors of students' postgraduate performance (Allison and Long, 1990; Geuna, 2015; Long 
and McGinnis, 1985). A line of literature on the organizational design of labs, either in industry or in 
academia, has also been investigating various organizational factors such as prestige, age, and size as 
determinants of performance (e.g., Heinze et al., 2009; Pelz and Andrews, 1966). Nevertheless, prior 
literature has rarely looked into the detail of supervisory settings with few exceptions (Shibayama et al., 
2015). 
 
3. Context of Academic Training in Japan 
In Japan, approximately 700 universities offer four-year undergraduate programs, among which 
approximately 400 universities offer PhD programs. They are grouped into three types based on 
governing bodies: national, regional (of prefectures or cities), and private. Among the three types, national 
universities are the main player of scientific research and academic training while most private 
universities focus on undergraduate education. For example, national universities accounted for 75% of 
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12,000 PhD degrees awarded in 2013.1 
Most postgraduate education programs in Japan consist of a two-year master program and a three-year 
PhD program.2 A majority of graduate students decide whether to proceed to a PhD program during a 
master program (Kato et al., 2012). Once students are admitted to PhD programs, the majority of students 
graduate with limited delay. For example, 50% of the students who enrolled in Science and Engineering 
PhD programs in 2008 graduated in three years, 79% within four years (plus one year), and 91% within 
six years (plus three years).3 Graduation in the Japanese PhD system does not necessarily mean that 
students have successfully earned degrees. That is, students can choose to graduate PhD programs as long 
as they meet certain credit conditions, and after graduation they can apply for degrees as soon as 
completing dissertations. In fact, 13% of PhD graduates in our sample did not have degrees at the time of 
the survey. This is relatively rare in Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) fields 
but fairly common in Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences (HASS). 
In most PhD programs, each PhD student is officially under the supervision of a single professor. In 
practice, however, there is a significant variation in the supervisory settings. The variation is attributed to 
a few sources, including the setting of the official supervisor's lab and the policies or the environment of 
the department that offers the PhD programs. As for the latter, multiple faculty members in the same 
department usually participate in the dissertation evaluation committee, and they sometimes play a 
proactive role in supporting PhDs from early program stages. As for the former, a lab usually involves 
other students and staff, who can also participate in the supervision of students. Particularly, national 
universities in STEM fields tend to adopt so-called chair system modelled on the German system, where a 
senior professor organizes a lab and supervises not only students but also junior professors. In this 
hierarchical structure, the supervision of students is often in part or whole delegated to junior professors, 
postdocs, and even senior students. The chair system sometimes causes organizational barriers between 
labs, restricting students' interaction with researchers in other labs. 
PhD programs in Japan used to be mainly meant to train academic researchers, so most students enrolling 
in PhD programs pursued academic careers. However, around the 1980s and 1990s, the postgraduate 
education system was repositioned for the training of knowledge workers in general to satisfy diversifying 
societal needs (Ehara and Umakoshi, 2004: Ch.3). A series of system reform increased the admission 
quota for postgraduate programs, and many postgraduate programs were newly opened.4 It also allowed 
candidates who already have jobs to enroll in PhD programs and pursue degrees without quitting the jobs 
often in part-time. This so-called "professional" PhD has become common in applied fields such as 
                                                        
1 Source: School Basic Survey (http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/toukei/chousa01/kihon/1267995.htm). 
2 A few universities offer 5-year integrated PhD programs. PhD programs in some fields take four years, such as in 
Medicine, Veterinary sciences, and Pharmacy. 
3 The statistics about students are obtained from School Basic Survey. 
4 Until a reform in 2005, the government controlled the admission quota of postgraduate courses in Japanese universities 
(MEXT, 2015).  
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Medicine and in Social Sciences. Recent years have also seen an increasing number of international PhDs. 
Overall, the number of PhD students was doubled in 1991-2000. The rapid expansion of the postgraduate 
system, however, has been heavily criticized for compromising the quality of PhD training. In addition, 
employment conditions for recent PhD graduates are not necessarily sufficiently stable (Cyranoski et al., 
2011), while increasing employment of PhDs in industry is consistent with the policy direction. 5 
Consequently, academic careers have become a less popular option for students, which partially 
contributed to a recent decline in PhD enrolment (Morichika and Shibayama, 2016). 
 
4. Data and Method 
4.1. Survey data 
This study draws on a national survey, Japan Doctoral Human Resource Profiling (JD-Pro). The 
population of JD-Pro was the entire cohort of 16,445 PhD students who graduated from PhD programs in 
Japanese universities in the academic year of 2012. It covered all disciplines and all Japanese universities 
that offer PhD programs. The survey was carried out in 2014, 1.5 years after their graduation. JD-Pro 
included several lines of questions concerning PhD training programs, employment after graduation, 
research activities, and so forth. This study particularly draws on the questions about supervisory settings 
for PhD training and several outcome measures. The survey was conducted both on a web-based system 
and by mail and collected 5,052 effective responses (response rate = 38.1%). Kobayashi (2015) reports 
the detail of the survey.6 The sample consists of international PhDs (15%), professional PhDs (34%), and 
regular PhDs (52%); in the fields of Science (17%), Engineering (24%), Agriculture (7%), Health (29%), 
Humanities (8%), Social sciences (9%), and others (6%); and in Univ tier = 1 (38%), 2 (17%), 3 (5%), 
and 4 (20%). The mean age is 38, and 28% are female.  
 
4.2. Measures 
4.2.1. Supervisory setting 
The survey inquired into a few questions regarding PhD supervisory settings. In particular, it asked 
about two main researchers who most frequently gave instructions in research projects, among the 
official supervisor, internal faculty members (in the same university) other than the official supervisor, 
external faculty members (in different universities), and non-faculty researchers (typically, senior 
students or postdocs in the same lab). It also inquired into the frequency of instruction given by the two 
researchers. Based on these measurements, we prepared two sets of variables. The first set is the 
                                                        
5 In STEM fields, a PhD degree is almost a requirement for professional academic careers currently. PhD graduates 
typically experience several years of a postdoc period before earning junior faculty positions. For example, 44% of 
Science PhD graduates in 2002-2006 became postdocs while only 6.2% obtained faculty positions immediately after 
graduation (Misu et al., 2010). 
6 Kobayashi (2015) used response weights based on gender, birth year, PhD field, student type, and university tier in 
order to adjust response bias, whereas this study does not, which makes some differences in the results between two 
papers.   
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frequency of instruction given by the four categories of researchers: 1) the official supervisor (Official 
supervisor), 2) internal faculty members (Internal faculty), 3) external faculty members (External 
faculty), and 4) non-faculty researchers (Non-faculty). Each variable takes a five-point scale, 0: never, 1: 
once a half year or less, 2: once a quarter, 3: once or twice a month, 4: once a week or more (Figure 1A). 
The second set consists of a single variable, the number of faculty members (i.e., excluding non-faculty 
researchers) engaged in PhD instruction once a month or more frequently (#Faculty). The variable takes 
a value of 0, 1, or 2 (Figure 1C).7 
 
4.2.2. Outcome of PhD training 
This study draws on three sets of outcome variables. The first set consists of three variables concerned 
with PhDs' careers. First, the survey asked whether the respondents had earned a degree by the time of 
the survey. We coded a dummy variable 1 if a degree was awarded and 0 otherwise (Degree awarded). 
Second, the survey inquired into several questions on the employment conditions of the respondents at 
the time of the survey.8 We coded a dummy variable 1 if one had a job in an academic organization -- 
i.e., university or a public research organization -- and 0 otherwise (Academic career). Third, the survey 
asked the link between the job and the subject of PhD dissertations. We coded a dummy variable 1 if a 
respondent's job is related to his or her PhD dissertation and 0 otherwise (Related job). 
The second set consists of two variables concerned with performance. 75% of PhDs were engaged in 
research jobs after graduation. For those who had research jobs, we measured the number of their 
scientific articles published until the time of the survey (#Pub). While most PhDs who obtained jobs in 
academia continued research, only 56% of those at non-academic jobs were engaged in research. To 
address this limitation for non-academic workers, we also measured the wage rate as a proxy of 
performance (Wage rate). 
The final set of outcome variable consists of a single measure based on the subjective evaluation by the 
respondents. Namely, the survey inquired into PhD students' satisfaction with the program in a 
five-point scale ranging from 1: not satisfied to 5: satisfied (PhD satisfaction). 
 
4.2.3. Control variables 
The regression analyses control for several factors. We include three dummy variables corresponding to 
the student types (regular PhD, professional PhD, and international PhD) and seven dummy variables 
                                                        
7 Note that the survey inquired into the first and the second instructors, and thus, both sets of variables lack precision. 
For the first set, the survey ignores third and fourth instructors, if any. We assume that their instruction frequency was 
negligible and coded the variables 0 if the category was not included in the first and second instructors. The second-set 
variable is right-censored. In addition, it overlooks the possibility that a student is supervised by, for example, two 
internal faculty members. In this regard, precisely speaking, the variable may be associated with the diversity of 
supervisors rather than their number. 
8 4.5% of the respondents were not employed. 
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for PhD fields (PhDs in Science, Engineering, Agriculture, Health, Humanity, Social Sci, and Others). 
As a proxy of the performance of supervisors, we control for the university tier of degree-awarding 
universities. We grouped Japanese universities into four tiers on the basis of publication shares at the 
organization level and coded the top tier 4 and the bottom tier 1 (Univ tier).9 
We also include several control variables for individual attributes. We control for the age (Age) and 
gender (Female) of the respondents. To proxy respondents' performance prior to PhD training, we 
include a dummy variable coded 1 if a respondent had a national PhD fellowship that is awarded on the 
basis of their performance before the PhD course (Fellowship).10 We also control for respondents' 
motives to pursue PhD degrees at the time of enrollment. In particular, we include a dummy variable 
coded 1 if the motive was "to become an academic teacher or researcher" (Academic motive) and 
another dummy variable coded 1 if the motive was "to delay job hunting" (Job motive). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Result 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of the variables. Concerning the career 
outcomes, 87% of the respondents were awarded PhD degrees by the time of the survey; 57% chose 
academic careers; 89% had jobs somewhat related to their PhD dissertations. The median count of 
publications is three, and the average wage rate is 2,200 JPY per hour. 80% of PhDs were satisfied with 
the training they received. 
 
                                                        
9 University tier is based on the publication share of each university among all publications with Japanese addresses:>5% 
(tier=4), 1-5% (tier=3), 0.5-1% (tier=2), and <0.5% (tier=1). Note that university tier does not necessarily indicate 
university ranking. 
10 The national government offers a fellowship for three years. The selection is based on the applicant's performance 
before PhD (i.e., mostly during the master program). 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
 
 
Note: N = 5,052 
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5.1. Supervisory setting 
As expected, the majority of the PhDs were mainly instructed by their official supervisors while some 
were given instruction mainly by other faculty or non-faculty members. About half of the PhDs were 
given secondary instruction by internal faculty members. The frequency of instruction varies 
considerably; while 60% of PhDs received weekly or more frequent instruction, 10% did so quarterly or 
less. Figure 1A illustrates the instruction frequency given by instructors' categories: 52% of PhDs 
received instruction from their official supervisors weekly or more frequently; 35% were instructed by 
internal faculty members at least monthly; 13% received any instruction by external faculty members 
and 21% by non-faculty researchers. Overall, 53% of PhDs received frequent instruction -- once a 
month or more frequent -- from a single faculty member (i.e., one of the official supervisor, internal 
faculty member, or external faculty member); 36% received frequent supervision from two of them, and 
11% received no frequent supervision from faculty members. 
Figure 1B provides breakdowns by student types, PhD fields, and university tiers. To analyze the 
determinants of the supervisory settings systematically, Table 2 regress the supervisory settings on 
several contextual variables. Since the dependent variables are all ordinal, we draw on ordinal logistic 
regressions. Both descriptive and regression analyses indicate some noticeable patterns in the 
supervisory setting. Comparing student types, professional PhDs were less frequently instructed by 
official supervisors, presumably because they are less frequently present at the lab, and they were also 
less instructed by non-faculty researchers probably due to their higher social status. International PhDs 
were more often instructed by official supervisors and internal faculty members but less by external 
faculty members, perhaps because their network outside their main affiliation is limited. Comparing 
PhD fields, PhDs in Health less frequently received instruction by official supervisors but more 
frequently by internal faculty members. This may be because of the hierarchical chair system typical in 
the field, where the official supervisor delegates PhD supervision to junior lab members. Instruction by 
official supervisors was less frequent also in HASS, perhaps due to a less team-based nature of research 
activities in the field. Among university tiers, higher-tier universities were characterized by less frequent 
instruction by official supervisors but more frequent instruction by non-faculty researchers. This is 
probably because labs in higher-tier universities are larger and afford to use their lab members (e.g., 
senior students, postdocs) for PhD supervision. 
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Figure 1. Supervisory Setting 
(A) Frequency by instructor category 
 
(B) Frequency by instructor category - breakdown 
 
(C) Frequently supervising faculty members 
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Table 2. Prediction of supervisory setting (Ordinal logistic regression) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                 Model 1                        Model 2                        Model 3                        Model 4                        Model 5            
                     Official supervisor               Internal faculty               External faculty                    Non-faculty                       #Faculty            
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Age                                -.026***  (.004)               -.002     (.004)               -.007     (.006)               -.043***  (.007)               -.019***  (.004) 
Female                             -.084     (.066)               -.103†   (.063)                .076     (.099)               -.041     (.087)               -.167*    (.066) 
Fellowship                         -.110     (.119)               -.361**   (.124)               -.129     (.174)                .416***  (.121)               -.248*    (.115) 
Regular PhD                          
Professional PhD                   -.509***  (.075)               -.192**   (.073)                .021     (.116)               -.278*    (.110)               -.356***  (.078) 
International PhD                   .339***  (.097)                .243**   (.086)               -.811***  (.170)                .115     (.113)                .117     (.090) 
PhD in Science                       
PhD in Engineering                  .031     (.094)                .095     (.091)               -.436**   (.135)               -.395***  (.108)               -.018     (.090) 
PhD in Agriculture                  .019     (.136)                .154     (.129)               -.498*    (.205)                .082     (.147)               -.038     (.130) 
PhD in Health                      -.391***  (.093)                .657***  (.090)               -.430**   (.132)               -.085     (.107)                .296***  (.089) 
PhD in Humanity                    -.816***  (.119)                .139     (.115)                .146     (.161)               -.782***  (.166)               -.465***  (.124) 
PhD in Social Sci                  -.421***  (.118)                .310**   (.111)               -.165     (.171)               -.966***  (.179)               -.163     (.119) 
PhD in Others                      -.410**   (.133)                .277*    (.127)               -.190     (.192)               -.493**   (.179)               -.045     (.135) 
Univ tier                          -.189***  (.026)               -.178***  (.025)                .039     (.038)                .274***  (.033)               -.202***  (.026) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Chi-squared stat                 376.292***                     187.878***                      58.710***                     388.648***                     199.787***         
Log likelihood                 -5530.903                      -6650.746                      -2774.724                      -3448.492                      -4494.770            
N                                   4802                           4809                           4817                           4814                           4817            
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: Unstandardized coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). Two-tailed test. †p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. Regular PhD and PhD in Science are the reference 
groups for student types and for PhD field respectively.
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5.2. Determinants of training outcome 
5.2.1. Career outcome 
We examine the effect of the supervisory settings on the possibility of earning a degree in time (Table 3). 
Model 1 shows that frequent supervisions by the official supervisor and by the external faculty members 
are significantly positively associated with degree attainment. Model 2, instead, uses #Faculty as the 
main independent variable. To distinguish the impact of having a single instructor and that of having a 
second instructor, Model 2 includes two corresponding dummy variables with #Faculty=1 as the 
reference group. The result shows that a lack of professional supervision is associated with failing to 
earning degrees, but that having multiple instructors has only insignificant impact. It is plausible that 
supervisors decided to give frequent instructions to PhDs who had seemed likely to earn degrees, so 
Models 3 and 4 control for PhDs' motives to pursue degrees. Indeed, PhDs whose motive was to delay 
job hunting are less likely to earn degrees, while those who aimed to attain academic jobs are more 
likely to do so. After controlling for these motives, the effect of the supervisory settings remains 
significant, implying that frequent supervision does increase the likelihood of earning degrees. We also 
ran the same model for several sets of subsamples, finding that the effect of the supervisory settings is 
rather consistent between student types, PhD fields, and university tiers. As to the control variables, the 
result suggests that young PhDs, PhDs with fellowship, and international PhDs are more likely to earn 
degrees than otherwise. 
Second, Table 4 examines how the supervisory settings influence PhD's choice between academic and 
non-academic careers. As the dependent variable, academic career, is dichotomous, we use logistic 
regressions. Table 4A suggests that instructions by official supervisors and by external faculty members 
are positively associated (Model 1) -- or lack of it is negatively associated (Model 2) -- with academic 
career choice. Although PhDs who were not interested in academic careers might be unwilling to see 
supervisors frequently, the models have already controlled for PhD's motives, so the supervisory settings 
seem to influence the career choice. Because PhD degrees are often a precondition to obtain academic 
jobs, Models 3 and 4 additionally control for degree awarded. Though it somewhat weakens the effect 
of the supervisory settings, the magnitude of most coefficients remains unchanged, suggesting that 
supervisory settings affect the career choice independently from its influence on degree attainment. 
Among the control variables, the result finds that females are more likely to pursue academic careers 
than males. Professional PhDs, who had jobs, are less likely to pursue academic careers than regular 
PhDs because many of them continued their original jobs. On the other hand, international PhDs are 
more likely to pursue academic careers as many of them explicitly aimed at degrees for academic career 
development. 
Since Table 4A indicates significant differences between PhD fields, Table 4B splits the sample by PhD 
fields into STEM (Science, Engineering, and Agriculture), Health, and HASS (Humanities and Social 
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sciences). In STEM, non-faculty's supervision shows a significantly negative effect (Model 1). Frequent 
instruction by non-faculty researchers, presumably senior students and postdocs in the same lab, might 
imply that the lab was large and internal competition was severe, and thus, PhDs might find it difficult 
to pursue academic careers. In HASS, on the other hand, a lack of faculty's supervision shows a 
significantly negative effect (Model 6). This is perhaps because the less team-based nature of HASS 
research makes an instruction by a single faculty member all the more influential. 
As the third measure of career outcomes, Table 5 examines how areas of jobs can be influenced by 
supervisory settings. Model 1 shows that the instruction by official supervisors is positively associated 
with job relatedness, implying that frequent instruction by supervisors reinforces PhDs' interest and 
encourages them to continue research in the same field. The model finds that academic career has a 
significantly positive effect because PhDs at academic jobs are obviously likely to continue related jobs. 
Thus, we split PhDs who chose academic jobs (Models 3 and 4) and PhDs who chose non-academic 
jobs (Models 5 and 6), to find that the effect of supervisory settings is significant only for the academic 
subsample.  
Models 5 and 6 also show that PhDs in Engineering, Agriculture, and Health tend to engage in related 
jobs in industry. As these three fields are applied, this result might suggest that these fields are 
successfully transferring knowledge workers to industry, as designed. Interestingly, the models show 
that PhDs who intended to delay job hunting are likely to find jobs unrelated to PhD subjects. Thus, 
training for PhDs with such a motive may be ineffective in transferring knowledge workers to industry. 
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Table 3. Prediction of degree awarded (Logistic regression) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                 Model 1                        Model 2                        Model 3                        Model 4            
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Age                                -.016**   (.006)               -.017**   (.006)               -.015*    (.006)               -.016**   (.006) 
Female                             -.136     (.104)               -.143     (.104)               -.130     (.105)               -.136     (.104) 
Fellowship                          .947***  (.273)                .951***  (.274)                .924***  (.274)                .931***  (.274) 
Regular PhD                          
Professional PhD                    .211†   (.125)                .204     (.125)                .212†   (.126)                .206     (.126) 
International PhD                   .851***  (.165)                .822***  (.163)                .811***  (.166)                .779***  (.165) 
PhD in Science                       
PhD in Engineering                  .274     (.186)                .293     (.185)                .307†   (.186)                .322†   (.185) 
PhD in Agriculture                  .167     (.261)                .122     (.257)                .193     (.261)                .148     (.257) 
PhD in Health                       .621***  (.184)                .567**   (.182)                .619***  (.184)                .562**   (.183) 
PhD in Humanity                   -2.220***  (.174)              -2.184***  (.172)              -2.280***  (.176)              -2.249***  (.174) 
PhD in Social Sci                 -1.613***  (.176)              -1.601***  (.174)              -1.663***  (.178)              -1.653***  (.176) 
PhD in Others                     -1.235***  (.194)              -1.224***  (.193)              -1.301***  (.196)              -1.294***  (.195) 
Univ tier                           .109**   (.042)                .098*    (.042)                .103*    (.042)                .092*    (.042) 
Job motive                                                                                       -.501*    (.237)               -.513*    (.235) 
Academic motive                                                                                   .257*    (.102)                .267**   (.101) 
Official supervisor                 .246***  (.040)                                               .246***  (.040)                                
Internal faculty                    .060†   (.036)                                               .064†   (.036)                                
External faculty                    .165**   (.056)                                               .165**   (.056)                                
Non-faculty                         .001     (.041)                                               .008     (.042)                                
#Faculty=0                                                        -.644***  (.129)                                              -.651***  (.130) 
#Faculty=1                           
#Faculty=2                                                         .162     (.106)                                               .169     (.107) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Chi-squared stat                 746.997***                     736.271***                     756.285***                     745.811***         
Log likelihood                 -1550.253                      -1561.804                      -1542.589                      -1553.273            
N                                   4800                           4817                           4792                           4804            
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: Unstandardized coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). Two-tailed test. †p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. Regular PhD, PhD in Science, and #Faculty=1 are the 
reference groups for respective sets of independent variables. 
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Table 4. Prediction of academic career choice (Logistic regression) 
(A) Base model 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                 Model 1                        Model 2                        Model 3                        Model 4            
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Age                                -.021***  (.005)               -.020***  (.005)               -.020***  (.005)               -.019***  (.005) 
Female                              .325***  (.074)                .336***  (.074)                .338***  (.075)                .350***  (.074) 
Fellowship                          .213     (.136)                .184     (.135)                .182     (.136)                .153     (.136) 
Regular PhD                          
Professional PhD                   -.313***  (.086)               -.308***  (.085)               -.328***  (.086)               -.322***  (.086) 
International PhD                   .280**   (.106)                .258*    (.105)                .241*    (.106)                .221*    (.105) 
PhD in Science                       
PhD in Engineering                 -.335***  (.101)               -.323**   (.101)               -.347***  (.102)               -.336***  (.101) 
PhD in Agriculture                  .095     (.144)                .069     (.143)                .088     (.145)                .063     (.144) 
PhD in Health                       .540***  (.101)                .536***  (.100)                .517***  (.102)                .514***  (.101) 
PhD in Humanity                     .100     (.137)                .135     (.136)                .327*    (.144)                .362*    (.144) 
PhD in Social Sci                   .205     (.135)                .232†   (.134)                .344*    (.138)                .373**   (.137) 
PhD in Others                       .568***  (.157)                .583***  (.157)                .672***  (.159)                .687***  (.159) 
Univ tier                           .058*    (.029)                .052†   (.029)                .053†   (.029)                .047     (.029) 
Job motive                         -.499**   (.160)               -.509**   (.160)               -.478**   (.161)               -.487**   (.160) 
Academic motive                    1.119***  (.069)               1.125***  (.069)               1.113***  (.070)               1.118***  (.069) 
Degree awarded                                                                                    .558***  (.101)                .564***  (.101) 
Official supervisor                 .059*    (.028)                                               .045     (.029)                                
Internal faculty                    .032     (.024)                                               .029     (.024)                                
External faculty                    .114**   (.036)                                               .106**   (.037)                                
Non-faculty                        -.045†   (.026)                                              -.046†   (.026)                                
#Faculty=0                                                        -.222*    (.104)                                              -.177†   (.105) 
#Faculty=1                                                          
#Faculty=2                                                         .078     (.068)                                               .070     (.068) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Chi-squared stat                 634.000***                     620.651***                     664.694***                     652.177***         
Log likelihood                 -2957.850                      -2972.398                      -2942.503                      -2956.635            
N                                   4792                           4804                           4792                           4804            
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
(B) Field breakdown 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                 Model 1                        Model 2                        Model 3                        Model 4                        Model 5                        Model 6            
                                    STEM                           STEM                         Health                         Health                           HASS                           HASS            
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Official supervisor                 .072     (.047)                                               .067     (.047)                                               .021     (.071)                                
Internal faculty                   -.051     (.036)                                               .120**   (.041)                                               .044     (.064)                                
External faculty                    .026     (.056)                                               .249***  (.065)                                               .011     (.093)                                
Non-faculty                        -.132***  (.037)                                               .061     (.047)                                              -.034     (.084)                                
#Faculty=0                                                        -.116     (.174)                                              -.197     (.197)                                              -.484*    (.204) 
#Faculty=1 
#Faculty=2                                                         .124     (.101)                                               .179     (.122)                                              -.235     (.171) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Chi-squared stat                 439.050***                     423.198***                     124.745***                     109.928***                      75.878***                      81.075***         
Log likelihood                 -1332.802                      -1342.825                       -875.494                       -885.797                       -525.423                       -524.756            
N                                   2240                           2243                           1408                           1413                            842                            845            
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: Unstandardized coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). Two-tailed test. †p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. Regular PhD, PhD in Science, and #Faculty=1 are the 
reference groups for respective sets of independent variables. In Table (B), the control variables are omitted for parsimony. 
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Table 5. Prediction of job relatedness (Logistic regression) 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                 Model 1                        Model 2                        Model 3                        Model 4                        Model 5                        Model 6            
                                     All                            All                       Academic                       Academic                   Non-academic                   Non-academic            
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Age                                -.009     (.007)               -.010     (.007)               -.015     (.013)               -.012     (.013)               -.009     (.009)               -.011     (.009) 
Female                             -.320**   (.117)               -.316**   (.117)               -.081     (.198)               -.019     (.197)               -.426**   (.149)               -.421**   (.148) 
Fellowship                          .441†   (.248)                .469†   (.247)               1.204*    (.604)               1.208*    (.603)                .232     (.287)                .282     (.285) 
Regular PhD                          
Professional PhD                    .208     (.140)                .225     (.139)               -.477*    (.243)               -.483*    (.241)                .520**   (.172)                .521**   (.170) 
International PhD                   .205     (.182)                .203     (.180)                .738*    (.368)                .756*    (.367)               -.050     (.225)               -.065     (.222) 
PhD in Science                       
PhD in Engineering                  .423**   (.157)                .455**   (.155)                .450     (.336)                .496     (.335)                .405*    (.181)                .414*    (.179) 
PhD in Agriculture                  .154     (.219)                .134     (.217)               -.497     (.347)               -.542     (.347)                .567*    (.287)                .538†   (.282) 
PhD in Health                       .375*    (.156)                .336*    (.154)                .612*    (.292)                .457     (.288)                .367†   (.189)                .364†   (.187) 
PhD in Humanity                     .151     (.220)                .120     (.220)                .333     (.374)                .236     (.372)                .182     (.286)                .144     (.285) 
PhD in Social Sci                   .061     (.208)                .077     (.207)                .294     (.374)                .277     (.371)               -.033     (.263)               -.024     (.261) 
PhD in Others                       .416     (.253)                .400     (.252)                .731†   (.438)                .646     (.436)                .317     (.323)                .297     (.321) 
Univ tier                           .081†   (.046)                .072     (.046)                .173*    (.085)                .153†   (.084)                .028     (.056)                .026     (.056) 
Job motive                         -.808***  (.211)               -.799***  (.210)               -.571     (.446)               -.552     (.446)               -.829***  (.249)               -.809**   (.248) 
Academic motive                    -.076     (.117)               -.077     (.117)                .190     (.187)                .214     (.186)               -.270†   (.150)               -.270†   (.149) 
Academic career                    1.586***  (.115)               1.593***  (.114)                                                                                                                             
Official supervisor                 .100*    (.043)                                               .204**   (.072)                                               .042     (.053)                                
Internal faculty                   -.018     (.037)                                              -.043     (.066)                                               .021     (.046)                                
External faculty                   -.078     (.054)                                              -.001     (.097)                                              -.099     (.067)                                
Non-faculty                        -.019     (.041)                                              -.110     (.073)                                               .041     (.050)                                
#Faculty=0                                                         .163     (.165)                                               .416     (.322)                                               .076     (.195) 
#Faculty=1                           
#Faculty=2                                                         .173     (.110)                                               .462*    (.201)                                               .089     (.134) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Chi-squared stat                 284.524***                     279.759***                      57.227***                      52.244***                      61.827***                      56.832***         
Log likelihood                 -1413.330                      -1419.080                       -511.399                       -514.300                       -869.655                       -874.228            
N                                   4559                           4570                           2721                           2729                           1838                           1841            
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: Unstandardized coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). Two-tailed test. †p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. Regular PhD, PhD in Science, and #Faculty=1 are the 
reference groups for respective sets of independent variables. 
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5.2.2. Performance 
Next, we examine the impact of supervisory settings on PhDs' performance drawing on two 
measurements. First, we use the publication count as the measure of scientific performance (Table 6). 
Since this is a count variable, we use negative binomial regressions. Model 1 shows that instruction by 
external faculty members is positively associated with the publication count, suggesting that an external 
information source has positive impact on scientific performance. We suspect that the contribution of 
supervision should differ by the scientific performance of the instructors, so Models 3 and 4 add 
interaction terms of supervisory settings and the university tier. Model 3 finds positive interaction 
effects with instructions by official supervisors and by internal faculty members, suggesting that their 
instructions are effective only in high-tier universities. Similarly, Model 4 finds a positive interaction 
effect with instruction by multiple faculty members, suggesting that multiple instructors are effective 
only in high-tier universities. 
Concerning control variables, Table 6 shows that female PhDs publish less than male PhDs. Fellowship 
is associated with more publications. Professional PhDs publish more than regular PhDs, perhaps 
because they have longer academic careers before enrolling in PhD programs. International PhDs also 
perform better than regular PhDs. Academic motive shows significantly positive coefficients and job 
motive negative coefficients, suggesting that scientific performance is predictable to some extent by 
their initial motives for PhD degrees.  
As publication performance may not be the best measure of non-academic performance, we also draw 
on the wage rate as a proxy of performance for a subsample of PhDs who found jobs outside academia 
(Table 7). Though Models 1 and 2 found no significant effect of supervisory settings, Models 3 and 4 
show significant interaction effects with the university tier, similarly to Table 6, suggesting that 
instructions by official supervisors or by internal faculty members are effective only in high-tier 
universities. The wage rate can be determined on the basis of publication performance if one's job is 
research, so Models 5 and 6 additionally control for publication count using a subsample of 
non-academic PhDs whose job is research, which finds even clearer interaction effects. 
As for control variables, age has a significantly positive effect because the salary system in Japan is 
often seniority-based. Females earn less than males. Professional PhDs earn more than regular PhDs for 
their supposedly higher skills and longer professional experience. International PhDs earn less than 
regular PhDs, even though the former exceeds the latter in publication performance. This is partly 
because the majority of international PhDs found jobs outside Japan, where the salary standard is lower. 
Academic motive is negatively associated with the wage rate in non-academia, suggesting that those 
who initially intended to pursue academic careers but ended in non-academic careers earn less than 
those who did not have such initial intention.
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Table 6. Prediction of publication performance (Negative binomial regression) 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                           Model 1                        Model 2                        Model 3                        Model 4            
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Age                                           .001     (.002)                .002     (.002)                .001     (.002)                .002     (.002) 
Female                                       -.110**   (.034)               -.109**   (.034)               -.111***  (.034)               -.110**   (.034) 
Fellowship                                    .210***  (.052)                .204***  (.052)                .212***  (.053)                .208***  (.052) 
Regular PhD                                    
Professional PhD                              .212***  (.041)                .218***  (.041)                .214***  (.041)                .218***  (.041) 
International PhD                             .261***  (.044)                .243***  (.044)                .265***  (.044)                .247***  (.044) 
PhD in Science                                 
PhD in Engineering                            .172***  (.045)                .170***  (.045)                .167***  (.045)                .166***  (.045) 
PhD in Agriculture                            .196**   (.065)                .185**   (.065)                .192**   (.065)                .182**   (.065) 
PhD in Health                                 .105*    (.046)                .112*    (.046)                .104*    (.046)                .112*    (.046) 
PhD in Humanity                               .092     (.059)                .108†   (.059)                .095     (.059)                .107†   (.059) 
PhD in Social Sci                            -.104†   (.060)               -.105†   (.060)               -.101†   (.060)               -.103†   (.060) 
PhD in Others                                 .099     (.065)                .102     (.065)                .100     (.065)                .101     (.065) 
Univ tier                                     .033*    (.013)                .033**   (.013)               -.063     (.041)                .017     (.017) 
Job motive                                   -.170*    (.080)               -.175*    (.080)               -.168*    (.080)               -.168*    (.080) 
Academic motive                               .148***  (.029)                .152***  (.029)                .153***  (.029)                .155***  (.029) 
Official supervisor                          -.020     (.013)                                              -.064*    (.029)                                
Internal faculty                              .000     (.011)                                              -.044†   (.024)                                
External faculty                              .039*    (.016)                                              -.006     (.036)                                
Non-faculty                                  -.010     (.012)                                              -.021     (.029)                                
#Faculty=0                                                                   .008     (.045)                                               .106     (.104)  
#Faculty=1  
#Faculty=2                                                                   .003     (.030)                                              -.136*    (.067)  
Univ tier x Official supervisor                                                                             .018†   (.011)                                
Univ tier x Internal faculty                                                                                .019*    (.009)                                
Univ tier x External faculty                                                                                .019     (.014)                                
Univ tier x Non-faculty                                                                                     .005     (.010)                                
Univ tier x #Faculty=0                                                                                                                    -.039     (.038) 
Univ tier x #Faculty=2                                                                                                                     .061*    (.026) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Chi-squared stat                           167.356***                     154.445***                     175.271***                     162.797***         
Log likelihood                           -8294.305                      -8318.113                      -8290.348                      -8313.937            
N                                             3563                           3572                           3563                           3572            
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: Unstandardized coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). Two-tailed test. †p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. Regular PhD, PhD in Science, and #Faculty=1 are the 
reference groups for respective sets of independent variables. 
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Table 7. Prediction of wage rate for non-academic PhD sample (Ordinary least squares) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                           Model 1                        Model 2                        Model 3                        Model 4                        Model 5                        Model 6            
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Age                                           .057***  (.005)                .058***  (.005)                .057***  (.005)                .057***  (.005)                .058***  (.007)                .057***  (.007) 
Female                                       -.313***  (.088)               -.306***  (.088)               -.315***  (.088)               -.306***  (.088)               -.530***  (.124)               -.523***  (.124) 
Fellowship                                   -.044     (.155)               -.038     (.155)               -.042     (.155)               -.033     (.154)               -.077     (.186)               -.082     (.184) 
Regular PhD                                    
Professional PhD                              .633***  (.092)                .628***  (.091)                .642***  (.092)                .633***  (.091)                .470***  (.130)                .475***  (.127) 
International PhD                            -.482***  (.137)               -.478***  (.137)               -.477***  (.137)               -.474***  (.137)               -.599**   (.198)               -.603**   (.197) 
PhD in Science                                 
PhD in Engineering                            .062     (.102)                .064     (.102)                .060     (.102)                .064     (.101)               -.027     (.141)               -.008     (.139) 
PhD in Agriculture                           -.331*    (.152)               -.331*    (.152)               -.338*    (.152)               -.331*    (.152)               -.313     (.209)               -.309     (.209) 
PhD in Health                                 .767***  (.107)                .774***  (.106)                .777***  (.107)                .783***  (.106)                .483**   (.155)                .461**   (.154) 
PhD in Humanity                              -.824***  (.174)               -.836***  (.174)               -.809***  (.174)               -.835***  (.174)               -.913***  (.229)               -.911***  (.229) 
PhD in Social Sci                            -.153     (.158)               -.146     (.157)               -.125     (.158)               -.124     (.157)               -.220     (.214)               -.202     (.213) 
PhD in Others                                -.330†   (.186)               -.331†   (.186)               -.330†   (.186)               -.335†   (.185)               -.458†   (.241)               -.449†   (.240) 
Univ tier                                     .062*    (.031)                .064*    (.031)               -.136     (.098)                .024     (.041)               -.068     (.132)               -.033     (.055) 
Job motive                                   -.150     (.161)               -.153     (.161)               -.139     (.161)               -.141     (.160)               -.187     (.250)               -.185     (.250) 
Academic motive                              -.261**   (.087)               -.272**   (.087)               -.263**   (.087)               -.276**   (.087)               -.237*    (.112)               -.262*    (.112) 
Pub                                                                                                                                                                       .040**   (.015)                .039*    (.015) 
Official supervisor                          -.015     (.030)                                              -.119†   (.067)                                               .060     (.101)                                
Internal faculty                              .034     (.025)                                              -.051     (.053)                                              -.142†   (.077)                                
External faculty                             -.024     (.040)                                              -.045     (.092)                                              -.008     (.125)                                
Non-faculty                                   .004     (.028)                                               .028     (.062)                                              -.046     (.091)                                
#Faculty=0                                                                   .055     (.106)                                               .243     (.237)                                              -.124     (.319)  
#Faculty=1 
#Faculty=2                                                                   .120     (.074)                                              -.208     (.158)                                              -.354     (.221)  
Univ tier x Official supervisor                                                                             .046†   (.026)                                               .006     (.037)                                
Univ tier x Internal faculty                                                                                .040†   (.022)                                               .073*    (.030)                                
Univ tier x External faculty                                                                                .008     (.037)                                              -.006     (.051)                                
Univ tier x Non-faculty                                                                                    -.007     (.022)                                               .006     (.032)                                
Univ tier x #Faculty=0                                                                                                                    -.080     (.092)                                               .027     (.121) 
Univ tier x #Faculty=2                                                                                                                     .152*    (.064)                                               .232**   (.087) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F Test                                      47.837***                      53.639***                      39.620***                      48.284***                      17.819***                      21.314***         
Adjusted R-squared                            .319                           .318                           .320                           .321                           .277                           .276            
N                                             1803                           1805                           1803                           1805                           1011                           1013            
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: Unstandardized coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). Two-tailed test. †p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. Regular PhD, PhD in Science, and #Faculty=1 are the 
reference groups for respective sets of independent variables. 
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Table 8. Prediction of PhD's satisfaction (Ordinal logistic regression) 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                 Model 1                        Model 2            
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Age                                 .016***  (.004)                .011**   (.004) 
Female                             -.023     (.065)               -.042     (.064) 
Fellowship                          .282*    (.116)                .255*    (.115) 
Regular PhD                          
Professional PhD                    .459***  (.077)                .354***  (.076) 
International PhD                   .589***  (.093)                .599***  (.092) 
PhD in Science                       
PhD in Engineering                  .262**   (.091)                .262**   (.090) 
PhD in Agriculture                 -.133     (.127)               -.108     (.126) 
PhD in Health                      -.249**   (.090)               -.325***  (.088) 
PhD in Humanity                     .176     (.120)                .124     (.119) 
PhD in Social Sci                   .176     (.120)                .125     (.118) 
PhD in Others                       .101     (.133)                .051     (.132) 
Univ tier                           .026     (.025)                .011     (.025) 
Job motive                         -.495***  (.140)               -.460**   (.140) 
Academic motive                    -.088     (.062)               -.078     (.061) 
Academic career                     .196***  (.060)                .192**   (.059) 
Official supervisor                 .574***  (.027)                                
Internal faculty                    .220***  (.021)                                
External faculty                    .207***  (.032)                                
Non-faculty                         .136***  (.023)                                
#Faculty=0                                                       -1.297***  (.092) 
#Faculty=1 
#Faculty=2                                                         .455***  (.060) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Chi-squared stat                 707.569***                     466.210***         
Log likelihood                 -5648.357                      -5784.722            
N                                   4787                           4798            
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: Unstandardized coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). Two-tailed test. †p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p 
< .001. Regular PhD, PhD in Science, and #Faculty=1 are the reference groups for respective sets of independent 
variables.  
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5.2.3. PhD Satisfaction 
Finally, Table 8 predicts PhDs' satisfaction with PhD programs. As the dependent variable is ordinal, we 
use ordinal logistic regressions. Both Models 1 and 2 show that frequent supervision significantly 
increases the degree of satisfaction. Unlike in the previous sections, instruction even by non-academic 
researchers contributes to PhDs' satisfaction. The effect is almost universal across PhD fields and 
university tiers. 
 
6. Discussions 
As the modern society is increasingly becoming knowledge-driven, high-skilled knowledge workers are 
crucial for the sustainable development of the society (Bozeman et al., 2001). Although postgraduate 
education is playing a pivotal role in this regard, it has not necessarily been successful in producing 
human capital that meets the societal needs (Cyranoski et al., 2011; Gould, 2015). Issues in academic 
training might be attributable to gaps both in policy practices and in theories between higher education 
and scientific production, but empirical constraints are also responsible. That is, poor access to the 
inside of academic labs coupled with difficulty in identifying early careers of PhD graduates have been 
undermining our understanding on academic training. To fill in these limitations, this study aims to 
illustrate PhD supervisory settings in the Japanese context and investigate their impact on several 
outcome aspects, drawing on the national survey of a cohort of 5,000 PhD graduates from Japanese 
universities. 
The result first shows that most PhDs received instructions indeed by their official supervisors, and that 
half of them received additional instruction by internal faculty members. The frequency of instruction has 
a substantial variation; the majority received weekly instruction but some less than quarterly. Some PhDs 
received instruction by non-faculty members, such as senior students and postdocs. Overall, a great deal 
of variation is observed in the PhD supervisory setting both in quantity and in quality. 
We find that these variations produce significant differences in training outcome. In terms of career 
outcome, the result suggests that frequent supervision by faculty members (but not by non-faculty 
researchers) increases the likelihood of attaining degrees and finding jobs related to dissertation subjects. 
Successfully earning degrees is obviously desirable and finding jobs at least somewhat related to PhD 
research subjects also seems efficient. In this regard, recent policies in Japan might have created an 
undesirable situation in that they have allowed over-concentration of PhDs in a small number of labs, 
where PhD supervisors can spare insufficient time for the supervision of each PhD student (Shibayama 
and Baba, 2015). Indeed, our result shows that instruction by faculty members is significantly less 
frequent in higher-tier universities. Therefore, it is advisable to adequately control the number of PhDs 
that a supervisor can actually supervise. The result also suggests that frequent supervision decreases the 
likelihood of choosing non-academic careers. Given that modern higher education system is expected to 
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supply PhDs both to academic and non-academic sectors, this result implies that training systems for 
academic and non-academic sectors might need to be differentiated (e.g., distinct courses, training by 
practitioners for the latter). 
Concerning the performance outcome, the result finds that the frequent supervision by internal faculty 
members increases publication performance as well as the wage rate only in high-tier universities. In 
low-tier universities, on the other hand, frequent supervision does not make effective improvement in 
graduates' performance. This is potentially because training effect on performance is contingent to 
supervisors' scientific capabilities. This result also points to the necessity for faculty members to allocate 
sufficient time and resources for academic training in high-tier universities. 
Finally, the result suggests that frequent supervision both by faculty members and by non-faculty 
researchers increases PhDs' satisfaction. This is the only outcome that is positively associated with 
instruction by non-faculty researchers. This implies that PhDs can be satisfied even when their 
performance is not improved. In this regard, PhDs' subjective evaluation needs to be cautiously 
interpreted when used for policymaking purposes. 
These results warrant some reservations. The sample specificity restricts the generalizability of the 
findings, as postgraduate education systems obviously differ by country. A few sources of endogeneity are 
concerned. The measurements of the key variables may need improvement. More detailed analyses on the 
organizational setting of labs may be informative. Training effect on longer-term performance is also of 
interest. We plan to conduct follow-up surveys of the same cohort of PhDs, whereby we expect to address 
part of these issues.  
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本調査における博士課程の指導状況の把握については、平成 26年度「博士人材追跡調査」助
言委員会において、濱中淳子委員(独立行政法人大学入試センター,当時)からご助言を頂いたも
のである。これにより不透明であった日本の博士課程での研究指導状況とそのインパクトにつ
いて検証出来たことは、大きな成果であったと考えられる。この場を借りて改めてお礼を申し
上げたい。 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION PAPER No.150 
 
博士課程での研究指導状況とインパクト－「博士人材追跡調査」による総合的な分析－ 
 
2016年 7月 
 
文部科学省 科学技術・学術政策研究所 第１調査研究グループ 
柴山創太郎，小林淑恵 
 
〒100-0013 東京都千代田区霞が関 3-2-2 中央合同庁舎第 7号館 東館 16階 
TEL: 03-3581-2395 FAX: 03-3503-3996 
 
Impact of PhD Supervising Setting: A Comprehensive Analysis based on  
"Japan Doctoral Human Resource Profiling, JD-Pro"  
July 2017 
 
Sotaro SHIBAYAMA and Yoshie KOBAYASHI 
 
1stPolicy-Oriented Research Group 
National Institute of Science and Technology Policy (NISTEP) 
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), Japan 
 
http://doi.org/10.15108/dp150 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
http://www.nistep.go.jp 
 
